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Summary:
While many people are familiar with the phrase “made in China”, most are not familiar
with the Chinese workers who make their products. Since the late 1980s, China’s economy has
grown significantly due to its increased participation in the manufacturing of products for export,
focusing largely on light manufacturing products such as consumer goods and textiles. To
accommodate its booming manufacturing industry, China has established many Special
Economic Zones, or SEZs, which provide special accommodations for foreign direct investment
such as lowered taxes or lax labor laws. The factories in SEZs have labor forces comprised
almost entirely of young rural women who migrated from the Chinese countryside to work in
manufacturing and live in factory dorms, often leaving home for the first time.
The participation of young rural Chinese women in light export manufacturing raises an
ethical issue among economists, consumers, and feminists alike: is manufacturing empowering
for the women working in factories, or exploitative? There are two main schools of thought
regarding this subject. The first viewpoint belongs to the traditional feminist economists who
generally believe that factory work is a hindrance in advancement for Chinese women. While
manufacturing may provide women with higher wages than would otherwise be available to
them, money does not counterbalance the negative impact of poor working conditions and a lack
of public services.
Neoclassical economists believe that rural Chinese women’s participation in light export
manufacturing is a means to an end. While conditions are not perfect within manufacturing,
better wages will lead to social development and growth for China, and women in particular, in
the long run. Contemporary feminists are a subgroup of neoclassical economists who base their
views on first-hand encounters with Chinese factory workers. They believe that traditional
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feminist’s views are biased based on an Americanized view of feminism and empowerment, and
that Chinese women are proud of their work.
After exploring the literature addressing these different viewpoints, I collected data about
manufacturing in China as well as information pertinent to women’s issues from a variety of
sources such as the National Bureau of Statistics of China and Gapminder. I used this data to run
three multivariate regressions, which revealed how a variety of different independent variables
were correlated with three different dependent variables. These dependent variables were based
on proxies for the Human Development Index, which measures growth in human development
through life expectancy, education, and gross national income per capita.
The results of the regressions showed that the average wages of staff and workers in
manufacturing had a significant impact on life expectancy, women’s education, and gross
national income per capita. Given these results, I concluded that the neoclassical economist and
contemporary feminists are correct in their belief that the increased wages resulting from light
export manufacturing have a positive effect on women’s social development and overall human
development in China.
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Literature Review
Introduction:
Arguably one of the greatest symbols of globalization in the world economy is the
outsourcing of light manufacturing from developed countries of the Global North, or western
world, to the developing countries of the Global South, or eastern world. The majority of
workers on this “global assembly line” for world production are women (Barker and Feiner,
2004). This is certainly true in China, where rural migrant women make up the vast majority of
factory workers producing many of the world’s electronics, toys, and clothes (Ngai, 2007).
While migration to the urban areas of China began in the early 1970s, the rise of the migrant
worker began in the late 1980s, when the hukou food coupon system was abolished (Shi, 2008).
The hukou system was originally established as a mechanism to prevent mobility within China,
but over time has loosened to allow migration, albeit with many restrictions. Since then, China
has seen a mass migration of rural peasants, including a huge number of women, to urban areas,
particularly in Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in order to fill the need for low skill, low
commitment labor in factories.
Urban migration has raised the question of how beneficial, if at all, light manufacturing
and factory work is for rural, female migrant workers in China. Two principle answers to this
question emerge in literature written by researchers typically classified as feminist and
neoclassical economists. Generally speaking, the feminist economist community is not confident
in the ability of factory work to improve the economic and social capabilities of the rural women
involved in the industry. In contrast, the neoclassical economists support the position of
neoliberal, free market policies and competitive advantages that will ultimately result in
economic growth and population-wide capability improvements for developing nations. A subset
5

of the neoclassical view also reevaluates many critiques from the traditional feminist camp by
applying a different brand of feminism not biased by Western world experiences. By no means
are these perspectives exhaustive of all viewpoints on the issue of manufacturing and women’s
capabilities, nor do contributors to the literature on this subject always fall clearly in one
category or the other. However, these are the primary ideologies represented in the literature, and
therefore stand as the parameters of this review. Recognizing this caveat, the issue of whether
Chinese women have improved their capabilities and quality of life through their participation in
light manufacturing and export based industry draws distinct lines between the neoclassical and
feminist schools of economic thought, and is still developing as a subject of research and debate.
Feminist Economists
The most well-known and heavily publicized complaints against factory work for rural
women are the poor working conditions and low wages. The neoclassical argument states that
developing countries have a comparative advantage in assembly line production, but this is often
seen by feminist economists as a deceptive way of portraying special economic zones with lax
labor laws and tax structures to attract investment. Even though this so-called comparative
advantage may lead to economic growth for the nation as a whole, the growth is unequal along
gender lines and women are economically marginalized due to ingrained gender norms (Barker
and Feiner, 2004). The gender issue with economic growth is not so much that women are unable
to find wage labor positions; while only a third of rural migrants are women, they compose over
70% of the migrant work force in export oriented SEZs throughout the country (Jacka, 2000).
The vast majority of these women are aged sixteen to twenty-five, and are valued for their
perceived patience, dexterity, and obedience (Davin, 2001). However, despite the increase in
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women’s wage-earning employment, they are crippled economically due to being stuck in low
paying, strenuous positions with little opportunity for advancement.
In support of this point, former president of the International Association for Feminist
Economics, Stephanie Seguino, goes as far as to assert that income inequality between men and
women has been a principle impetus for investment and growth in Asia (2000). Seguino’s
research reveals that women are generally paid lower wages than men in developing Asian
countries, even when level of education is taken into account. This is due to stereotypes that lead
to women’s initial hire into low wage positions, and gender norms that disallow female workers
from organizing and striving for higher wages. An export function used in this study reveals that
a decline in female workers’ wages leads to greater access to technology through trade, and
ultimately greater productivity. Similarly, a greater wage gap leads to a greater profit share of
income, greater investment spending, and increased productivity. Finally, a regression run
related to gender wage gaps seems to confirm Seguino’s proposal that a more significant gender
wage gap stimulates greater growth, even when accounting for education (2000). This research is
of concern to feminist economists, who interpret the findings as meaning that Asia’s economic
growth is in fact based in gender based income inequality. This interpretation indicates that it is
not in the economic interest of Asian countries, including China, to increase the wages of female
manufacturing workers because it would negatively impact overall economic growth for the
nation.
As Barker and Feiner specify, the cheap labor of women in factories does not just
translate to low wages, but also to a lack of safety protections, health precautions, and benefits
(2004). The neoclassical economists argue that factory jobs pay women more than agricultural
work, but feminist economists counter that this work is done in subpar conditions with wages
7

that are still dismally low (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). The higher pay can also be
accounted for by extremely long hours rather than higher wages, which negates the comparison
between agriculture and manufacturing work to some degree (Davin, 2001). There is little room
for advancement or raises for women on the assembly line, which could balance the negative
attitudes towards and effects of factory wages and conditions. This is evidenced by the fact that
only 1% of migrants hold managerial or technical jobs, which represent a higher paygrade than
that of factory workers (Zhao, 2005). Furthermore, it is fair to assume that of this 1%, a majority
are male as men are generally considered more capable of filling these roles due to gender
stereotypes. Researchers such as Tamara Jacka report first-hand accounts of harsh and
exploitative work and sexual harassment, with statistical reports supporting these allegations
(2000). In 2010, the China Labor Watch conducted a survey of 46 factories in mainland China
which reveal and support many of feminist economists’ concerns about wages, working hours,
and workers’ organization.
The three standout areas covered by the China Labor Watch survey are unionization,
overtime, and wages. In terms of unionization, 88.2% of surveyed factories had no trade union or
system for workers to report their grievances (2010). This is of concern from a feminist
economic point of view because it does not allow factory workers, who are majority women, to
fight for improved conditions or wages. When researching overtime hours, the China Labor
Watch found that 87% of the surveyed factories had daily overtime that exceeded three hours, or
did not implement a weekly day off. Furthermore, not a single factory stayed beneath the legal
maximum of 36 hours of overtime monthly. In fact, all of the factories had over 100 hours of
overtime per month, and some even exceeded 200 hours (2010). These hours speak to the
feminist concern for exploitative conditions in export-based manufacturing. The volume of hours
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also supports the proposition that higher pay in factories is a result of more time worked rather
than higher wages. This leads to more concern for feminist economists as lower wages can lead
to lower levels of intra-household bargaining power, even when the great number of hours
worked is considered (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007).
When looking at wages, the China Labor Watch found that 82.6% of the surveyed
factories do not pay wages in accordance with Chinese laws in regard to minimum wage and
overtime wages (2010). This statistic indicates that government regulation is not a panacea to
factory conditions and wages. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the wage gap between urban
and rural people in China has in fact widened since the mid-1980s, suggesting that the mass
migration of rural workers to urban areas has not hastened income equality as some
neoclassicists would like to suggest (Zhao, 2005). The China Labor Watch survey also revealed
seven severe problem areas in the canvassed factories: occupational safety and protection, social
insurance, dormitory conditions, labor contract, forced labor, discrimination, and child and minor
protection (2010). This research, combined with the research and proposals of the above
literature, suggest that feminist economists are correct in questioning if it is realistic to improve
working conditions in export oriented industries while simultaneously expanding women’s
employment in this field (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007).
In the case of manufacturing, an element of working conditions to be explored is the
dormitory system. The widespread use of dormitories for factories is often viewed as a way of
lowering the cost of living in a city for migrant workers, and of providing a safe living space for
rural women who have never lived alone, let alone in a big city (Ngai, 2007). These positive
aspects of the dormitory system are used for factory recruitment, and can make the recruitment
process less daunting both for the migrants and their families. However, they are also used to
9

give the factory greater control over its labor force (Davin, 2001). Factory dormitories are known
for strict regulations, and these controls help to lengthen the work day and quash calls for higher
wages. Furthermore, the dormitory system keeps migrants, particularly women, from settling
down in urban areas. These workers will generally spend only three to five years working in
industrial areas before returning home, which is ideal for employers who generally prefer young
women. The dormitory system allows young rural women to work, but the cramped and strict
communal living system is by no means a positive home environment (Ngai, 2007). The system
is meant to keep women between worlds, with both the enterprise and the state expecting female
rural workers to return home after a few years (Davin, 2001). The concept of the dormitory
system, while convenient for some migrants, supports the feminist economist view that the
manufacturing industry essentially exploits rural women’s labor, but ultimately expects them to
return to their rural setting when they are less useful or attractive to employers.
Another, less publicized feminist complaint against factory work in China is the strain of
unpaid care labor and social reproduction. While it is well known that 1978 marked the opening
of the Chinese economy to the world and a transformation from a socialist to a capitalist
economy, the effect of this movement on women’s care burden is often left unexamined. These
types of major economic and social transitions have a tendency to be based in gender-biased
policies that are ultimately responsible for increasing the care bias and burden for women (Berik,
Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). Much of this increased burden can be attributed to the fact that
neoclassical, capitalist economic theory is linked with neoliberal policies that encourage
economic liberalism and decreased interference from the government, both in terms of the
market and public works and projects (Barker and Feiner, 2004). Such policies lead to a push for
the privatization of services such as healthcare, welfare, housing, and education, which are
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provided by enterprises rather than the government (Davin, 2001). This economic transformation
and shift of policy fall under what is known as the Washington Consensus, a set of economic
policies that are supposedly the panacea for developing countries. In summary, the consensus
touts the Western values of free trade, capital mobility, privatization, and decreased government
regulation as the path to growth and prosperity. The issue that feminist economists find with this
plan is that the burden of privatization and public supports falls far more heavily on women than
men, as women are expected to make up the difference in care formerly provided through
government services (Barker and Feiner, 2004).
Roger Beattie argues that it is far more difficult to achieve universal insurance coverage
in any nation when a large portion of the urban labor force is participating in the informal
economy. This is problematic in that the vast majority of jobs created in developing nations are
part of the informal economy (2000). This contradiction is applicable to the Chinese economy,
where an enormous portion of the workforce in urban areas is made up of rural migrants in
flexible, sparsely regulated, and uncontracted, positions. These workers, including the rural
women in factories, are generally not provided benefits or insurance through their work, leaving
them without access to coverage. Other results of the move away from a socialist economy
included the deterioration of the commune based rural healthcare system, more expensive and
less accessible healthcare, a decline in public care, a rise in the uninsured, and higher fees for
education (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). While social care was by no means plentiful in
rural areas before the reform, it decreased even more post-reform, increasing the gap in equality
between rural and urban China (Davin, 2001).
A large part of the burden placed on Chinese women is their traditional duty of caring for
children and the elderly. The one-child policy in China increased the rigor of this responsibility
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as the duties related to elder care are generally not split between siblings, but rather fall on the
shoulders of an only child (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). The weight of this
responsibility has increased not only due to the lack of government public support for healthcare
and pensions, but because of the growth of the elderly population. Between 1990 and 2008, the
percentage of the Chinese population aged above 75 years grew from 1.65% to 3.39% (Cook and
Dong, 2011). While this shift in population indicates better living conditions and improved
general health, it also increases the length and types of care that women have to provide for their
own parents and often for their husbands’ parents as well.
In terms of childcare, the pressure for low profits and high margins has led many
companies to cut back on allowances made for caring labor. This, combined with decreased
support for maternity leave and childcare, particularly in low-wage jobs, have made it
exceedingly difficult for rural migrant women to both work and provide adequate childcare
(Cook and Dong, 2011). This difficulty is compounded by hukou law, a discriminatory issue
specific to China that supports feminist economist’s concerns about reproductive labor and
women’s care burden. While hukou was originally meant to restrict mobility within the country,
it is currently used to ensure that rural migrant workers are entitled to welfare only in their hukou
area, and that their children are not entitled to a public education outside of their native town or
city (Jacka, 2000). Two-third of rural children cannot access public education in urban areas, and
those who can generally pay higher fees than urban children (Shi, 2008). This raises the question
of how women can provide healthcare, childcare, and education for their children in the cities to
which they migrate. The answer is often that they simply cannot, and instead leave their children
home to be raised by relatives. As a result, this “left behind” population frequently faces an
increased workload to make up for the lost labor of the migrants. This workload often falls
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disproportionately on women and girls. Furthermore, there is evidence that paid work for rural
mothers correlates with negative health impacts on children. Given this analysis, feminist
economists often argue that higher wages do not outweigh the erosion of social protections for
reproductive and caring labor (Cook and Dong, 2011).
As previously mentioned, the hukou system can be viewed as a mechanism for
reinforcing the most negative aspects of light manufacturing for rural migrant women. The
system places mobility limitations on migrants, thus preventing them from changing status at
will and often excluding them from better jobs (Davin, 2001). Outside of these more blatant
discriminatory elements, Afridi, Li, and Ren’s research suggests that hukou status is internalized
and causes poorer performance in those with rural hukou. In an experiment in which school
children were asked to complete puzzles for money, the researchers found that when hukou
status was made salient, those with lower hukou statuses exerted less effort, even with the appeal
of a monetary incentive (2015). This discovery suggests that the neoclassical assertion that
everyone benefits from capitalism and growth is in fact impeded and hindered specifically in
China by a system that is inherently discriminatory.
The above points are the key issues the feminist economists identify with the light
manufacturing industry in China. This is not to say that every feminist economist opposes the
industry, or that every feminist approaches the system with equal skepticism. Furthermore, not
every piece of literature cited is written by a researcher considered to be a feminist economist.
However, on the whole, all of these issues have been raised by the feminist economist
community as problems that need remedying, particularly those issues that receive less media
coverage. To paraphrase Barker and Feiner, the case is not always that feminist economists
oppose globalization and capitalism on principle, but that they are more apt to be skeptical on the
13

ability of these movements to help everyone equally, particularly when it comes to differences in
gender (2004).
Neoclassical Economists
In basic terms, neoclassicists believe in the validity of a trade-off between labor standards
and employment based on the fact that market forces will lead to economic growth and
ultimately improved labor conditions and wages in the long run (Cagatay, 1996). The significant
growth in globalized businesses and export manufacturing over the past couple of decades
speaks to the pervasive nature of this economic theory. Manufacturing increased from 59% to
74% of total world merchandise exports between 1984 and the mid-1990s, and the vast majority
of this manufacturing growth has taken place in developing countries (Kabeer, 2004). According
to neoclassical principles, this increase in manufacturing should ultimately lead to economic
growth, better working conditions, and finally social growth, for developing nations and their
people.
The key argument in the neoclassical economist camp for manufacturing is that of
increased wages and incomes for migrant workers, particularly for women. It is difficult to argue
that factory work does not economically benefit migrants, particularly women, given that
working in provinces with high levels of foreign direct investment (and specifically for
enterprises funded through foreign investment) have resulted in higher wages for both genders
when compared to other regions and enterprises. Furthermore, China has the greatest female
labor force participation rate and smallest urban gender wage gap among developing nations,
indicating that women are unquestionably benefiting economically along with their male
counterparts (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007). This is not to say that the economic effects
of export manufacturing are without flaw. In his book Country Driving, Peter Hessler tells the
14

story of three young women who are able to earn decent wages through factory work and
ultimately work their way up into more lucrative positions. Nevertheless, Hessler also contrasts
the benefits of wage increases and opportunity with the increased lack of choice afforded to
peasants in terms of making a living wage (2010). However, this contrast is often viewed by
neoclassicists as a series of necessary growing pains in order to reach a greater economic good
for the nation as a whole. It is also important to note that while wages are low compared to those
in developed nations, women working in factories do not compare their purchasing power to that
of the consumers who will ultimately buy the products they make, but to that which they had
before working in manufacturing. (Chang, 2008).
A clear indicator of the recognized economic benefits for migrants working in export
manufacturing is the rate with which rural youth are choosing migration over farm work. A 2003
study by Knight and Song indicated that while 97% of rural households receive some income
from farming, two-thirds of households combine farm and non-farm work. About 37% of rural
households receive some income from migration, accounting for a large percentage of the nonfarm work performed by rural households. Knight and Song also found that migrants benefit
from shifting their resources from farming to non-farming activities because non-farming
activities are more financially rewarding both on average and at the margin. People living in
rural areas recognize this, which is indicated in Knight and Song’s finding that most rural
Chinese farmers did not want to increase the size of their farm, even if it was the only way to
increase income (2003). Farming is rapidly becoming a less attractive economic activity in rural
China, and export manufacturing provides an outlet for rural people, particularly youth, to enter a
new, more lucrative industry.

15

For women particularly, the effects of increased wages and work experience play out
more pronouncedly when they return to their villages (Davin, 2001). By increasing the
contribution that they make to their family income and by achieving upward movement in urban
employment, rural women often gain a position of greater respect within their family units
(Chang, 2008). Given that at least three-quarters of migrants return to their home villages after
migrating to urban areas, it is fair to say that a majority of female migrant workers ultimately
return home. It has also been observed that many of the migrant women returning do so with an
increased sense of independence and a penchant for challenging traditional gender roles.
Therefore, the effect of “going-out” and working in urban areas for the families of female
migrants is greater than simply receiving wages. It is also the basis for the beginning of a longterm shift of gendered power within the traditional gendered family structure in China (Davin,
2001).
The shift of gendered power within households is crucial to development within the
country as the increased employment and rank of women within household are generally
expected to reduce fertility, which allows parents to invest more time in each of their children
(Hare, 1999). This is a relevant change in rural China, where the one-child policy was not as
strictly enforced as it was in urban China. The increased rank of women within a household is
also expected to create incentive to invest in the education and well-being of girls (Hare, 1999).
The effect of increased investment in females, particularly children, is already evident in that
China has the smallest gender disparities in both adult and youth literacy rates among developing
nations (Berik, Dong, and Summerfield, 2007).
Despite the persistent evidence of higher wages and bargaining power within the family
structure, feminist economists and similarly concerned parties, almost always based in the
16

developed western world, often call for a social clause in international trade. Such a clause
would require the enforcement of minimum labor standards, with the threat of sanctions and
enforcement by the World Trade Organization. Naila Kabeer, though generally considered a
feminist as well as an economist, firmly disagrees with the imposing of a mandatory social
clause on the grounds that it would not ultimately be helpful to factory workers, particularly
women, employed in developing countries. She argues that the demand for a social clause comes
from people in developed nations who mean well, but do not understand that the working
conditions in light manufacturing are far better than the alternatives for women working in the
export industry (2004).
The neoclassical framework is consist with Kabeer’s rejection of a hypothetical social
clause, largely because neoclassicists believes that imposing a mandatory social clause on export
manufacturing would effectively destroy the comparative advantage that developing nations have
in assembly line manufacturing. Kabeer argues that those calling for a social clause on minimum
labor standards should try to consider the “view from below” rather than comparing labor
conditions in developing nations to those in already developed nations. By this, she means that
women in developing countries compare their wages and working conditions to those of other
jobs available to them, not to those of jobs in developing countries. When using this more
realistic measure, the outlook towards factory conditions is much improved. Kabeer also points
out that activists in developing nations often fail to distinguish between poor working conditions
that result from poverty and lack of development and blatant violations of human rights. While
the conditions in factories in Southern China are not ideal, neoclassical economists would argue
that this is due to underdevelopment more so than exploitation, and that conditions will
ultimately improve with further economic development (2004). Though there is room for
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improvement, neoclassicists believe that protective legislations such as social clause would
hinder market growth in developing countries and render women the victims rather than the
benefactors of the regulation (Cagatay, 1996)
In addition to subpar factory conditions, an undeniable issue for migrant workers is the
discriminatory hukou system. Neoclassicists recognize that the system permeates the lives of
migrants in urban areas in a number of ways, including the withholding of welfare, public
services, and education for rural children. However, it is evident that hukou laws have been made
progressively less oppressive through reforms resulting from China’s participation in
manufacturing and the world market. To begin, the hukou food couponing system, which made
migration next to impossible for rural peasants, was abolished in the 1980s as a direct result of
the need for labor in the special economic zones (Shi, 2008). Since then, the push of surplus
labor in rural areas and the pull of high labor demands in urban manufacturing have led to mass
migration and reforms in hukou law and related discriminatory legislation (Zhao, 2005). There
have been several reform experiments in regard to hukou and rural migrants in urban areas, such
as the abolition of fees that are applied specifically to rural migrants, the provision of some
social security for migrant workers, and increased access to public services, training, and
education for rural migrants in urban areas (Shi, 2008)
A major victory for rural migrants was the elimination of urban and rural hukou in 2001
(Zhao, 2005). Though this reform is not yet nation-wide, it has led to a more prominent
discussion on the merits and shortcomings of the hukou system, and has undoubtedly caused the
system to be rendered less rigid in consideration of the massive influx of migrants over the past
two and half decades. In more recent reforms, the Chinese government announced in 2015 that it
will be providing 13 million people hukou rights who have up until now been denied public
18

services and education due to their lack of hukou registration. Many of these “black children”
were secondary children born under the one-child population policy (Dong and Hunt, 2015). Due
to less rigid enforcement of the policy in rural areas than urban, it can be inferred that a large
number of people being awarded these rights are rural. Through these reforms, the rural Chinese
are slowly but surely being awarded more rights, recognition, and welfare by the government.
Reforms and social improvements can be accredited to China’s fairly newfound need for rural
migrants in its cities, and the neoclassical principal that economic growth will ultimately lead to
social growth as well.
One of the arguments explored in the previous section that feminist economists have
against the supposed positive effects of globalization and manufacturing is that most migrant
women still return home to their village and marry after working for a few years. They claim that
this pattern indicates no long term change in traditional gender roles as a result of factory work.
It is true that most women hope to marry following participation in factory work, and research of
female migrant workers revealed that choosing one’s own husband was considered the most
attractive aspect of migration. However, it is crucial to note that a collectivist society such as
China does not value the same kind of independence that is considered typical in the developed
world. The fact that rural women aspire to get married is not a symbol of oppression but of
cultural preference. Marriage actually represents a form of independence for women in Chinese
society because being married means being independent from one’s natal home and family rather
than being a life-long dependent. Marriage is strongly associated with adulthood for rural
Chinese women, and to stay unmarried would essentially leave them in a state of perpetual
childhood (Fang, 2012).
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A persistent desire for rural Chinese women to marry does not indicate that participation
in manufacturing has had no impact on the traditional institution. Migration to urban areas has
provided many rural women a means of escape from unwanted betrothals. There is also
evidence that migrant women are generally able to delay marriage from their early twenties until
their late twenties, when they have developed increased worth to their families and independence
through manufacturing work. Participating in this work can also increase women’s bride value,
giving them an opportunity for a more fortuitous marriage arrangement than they would have
made otherwise (Davin, 2001).
Romantic love has also found a spot within the new class of young rural migrants. As the
migrants have become more exposed to the modern urban middle class, they have begun to
emulate the desire for affection and romance in marriage rather than aspiring to business-like
couplings arranged by their parents. The shift towards romantic relationships has also permeated
the dating sphere for rural migrants. While casual dating is still frowned upon, it is no longer
scandalous or immoral for a woman to lose her virginity before marriage as long as marriage is
proposed soon thereafter (Fang, 2012). Some migrants even participate in dating services while
living in urban areas, taking their marriage prospects into their own hands (Chang, 2008). While
the views and traditions surrounding Chinese marriage can certainly seem unequal for women on
a western scale, it is unreasonable to expect them to change rapidly due to their deep roots in
Chinese history. However, the past two and half decades have shown the beginnings of change in
women’s approach towards marriage that are far more favorable for women than was the case in
the past.
Another issue related to Chinese women and marriage is divorce. While not at all
uncommon in the United States, it was highly stigmatized in China until fairly recently.
20

However, this began to change when China opened its economy to the rest of the world, and
divorce rates began to rise drastically as the effects of globalization took place. While divorce
was initially and still is more common in cities, rates have also risen in rural areas throughout the
country. Furthermore, as of 1994, more than 70% of divorces in China were initiated by women.
This statistic is indicative of the new social and economic freedom and independence
experienced by women during the globalization period. Newfound empowerment has led women
to demand more out of their marriages (Faison, 1994). Just as Chinese women are demanding
romance when they begin their marriages, they are demanding that romance and fair treatment
continue throughout the remainder of their marriage, demonstrating a power shift within the
traditional gender balance of marriage.
Contemporary Feminists
As mentioned previously, many feminist economist concerns about export manufacturing
and globalization come from a place of altruism and true concern. However, these concerns also
often come with a western bias and an “us” and “others” mindset (Rofel, 1993). Jocelyn Guilbert
claims that westerners, and Americans in particular, have redefined proper feminism as being
similar to American gender standards, and that anything that varies from this standard is
considered backwards and wrong, specifically when it comes from the non-white developing
world. This brand of thinking is what leads many American feminists to view Chinese women,
especially the rural poor, as helpless victims of poverty and oppression. While many of these
women are in fact poor even by Chinese standards, it is often not in the manner or to the degree
professed by American feminist. Guilbert also complains that Western media chooses to focus
only on the issues facing the third world, many of which have existed for long periods of time,
rather than progress (1998). However, a new brand of feminism has begun to emerge that aligns
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more closely with neoclassical ideals and attempts to evaluate issues in developing countries
without western bias.
This new brand of feminism, which will be referred to as contemporary feminism within
the context of this paper for the purpose of differentiating if from traditional feminist economics,
focuses on evaluating women’s issues and empowerment within the framework of their own
cultures. Academics who fall under this umbrella do not argue that there shouldn’t be research
and literature regarding feminism in developing nations, but rather that there should not be a
strict definition of feminism and liberation (Rofel, 1993). One of the greatest differences
between the contemporary feminist and the traditional feminist economists is that the
contemporary feminists base their beliefs heavily on first-hand accounts from women living in
the country being studied. Naila Kabeer claims that portraying third-world women as helpless
victims of an exploitative system fails to give any credit to the women themselves. She contends
that “simply highlighting their problems, and ignoring their gains, erases the possibility that there
may have been a calculus of choice involved and that women may consider these jobs worth
defending” (2004). With this in mind, contemporary feminists tend to adhere to neoclassical
principles in that they recognize the gains afforded to women in third-world countries through
globalization and manufacturing despite the issues that still need to be addressed in the future.
Contemporary feminists are quick to point out that rural Chinese youth are eager to
migrate to urban areas to find work. These youth do not identify with the farming lifestyle, and
there are studies that suggest that the majority of rural youth would prefer to be employed in a
city job than a rural job, even if compensation was the same (Fang, 2011). Leslie Chang offers
similar findings in her book Factory Girls, in which she describes the experiences of several girls
working in export manufacturing, and specifically of two young rural women working in
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Dongguan over the course of three years. Chang states that the majority of rural female workers
in Dongguan had chosen to “go out” and migrate of their own volition in search of freedom and
self-improvement rather than having been forced to go for economic reasons. She also
emphasizes the opportunities for advancement for rural women through participation in
industrialization and light manufacturing, but warns that advancement is highly dependent on
self-motivation, determination, and taking risks. The two women that Chang interacted with
most frequently, Wu Chunming and Lu Qingmin (Min), were both able to rise in station both
within their factories and their families during the three years in which the book takes place.
However, advancement and higher wages were the direct result of taking classes, acquiring
skills, and taking risks by jumping factories. Contemporary feminists argue that focusing on the
negative aspects of manufacturing diminishes the gains that women such as Chunming and Min
have worked so hard to achieve, and misrepresents a system that, though not perfect, has
provided many opportunities for rural women as a whole.
A final aspect that fuels contemporary feminism and links it to neoclassical economics is
representation. As has been alluded to above, many of the criticisms that globalization and
neoclassicists alike face is their representation as exploitative. However, contemporary feminists
claim that this narrative is strongly shaped and influenced by unequal representation based on
world power, and an insistence on victimizing politics “Others” (Rofel, 1993). Naila Kabeer goes
as far as to say that people from third-world countries used in promotional material in the
developed world are coached using “intensive educational technique” to create a narrative that is
helpful and supportive of the movement or ideals being pushed by the socially motivated
organization (2004). From this coaching comes the story of oppressed rural Chinese women
being used and mistreated by evil multinational corporations. Contemporary feminist reject this
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narrative, which has been largely embraced by traditional feminist economists, and instead
embraces a narrative shaped by progress and the benefits achieved by rural female migrants, who
certainly do not see themselves as victims. For this reason, contemporary feminist have moved
away from the traditional views of feminist economics and have aligned themselves with the
principles of neoclassicists.
Conclusion
Though outsourcing manufacturing to developing countries has become a staple in
western economies, it is still a topic of fierce ethical debate. China has proven to be a centerpiece
of this debate given its rapid expansion in the past two and a half decades, and the significant
number of rural Chinese women who currently participate in light manufacturing for the purpose
of export. The two primary sides of the Chinese manufacturing debate have emerged as
traditional feminist economists and neoclassical economists, with contemporary feminists
aligning most closely with neoclassical economists.
In short, traditional feminist economists believe that increased wages are not enough to
consider light manufacturing beneficial for Chinese women. They believe that the lack of public
services, poor working conditions, and absence of consideration for unpaid caring labor render
manufacturing as exploitative and as increasing gender inequality within the country.
Neoclassicists argue that economic growth through manufacturing will lead not only to better
wages but ultimately to social growth for the entire nation. Contemporary feminists support this
view based on first-hand encounters with Chinese women who value their work and the
independence which they have gained. Having now explored the current literature and ideas
surrounding light manufacturing and its effects on rural Chinese women, it is prudent to design a
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means of measurement to ascertain the true benefits that Chinese women have gleaned from
participation in light manufacturing.
Statistical Analysis
Methodology:
In order to test the hypothesis that migration and factory work have a positive impact on
the lives and social development of rural Chinese women, I ran three multivariate regressions
using the data analysis software StatCrunch. The data used represents the years 1990-2010 and
was gathered from GapMinder, the National Bureau of Statistics of China, and the government
websites for the cities of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. In these regressions
three different dependent variables are used to proxy the parameters of the Human Development
Index (HDI). The HDI was established in 1990 by Pakistani economist Mahbub UI Haq and
further developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. The index has three dimensions: having a
healthy life, being knowledgeable, and maintaining a decent standard of living. These
dimensions are measured using life expectancy at birth, years of education (mean for adults over
25 and expected for school children), and gross national income per capita. The calculated HDI
values for China are not included in the regressions because consistent data for the years 1990 to
2010 is not available. Therefore, I substituted life expectancy, GNI per capita based on
purchasing power parity (yuan), and years in school for women ages 15 through 44 as my
dependent variables.
For each regression I used six independent variables, some of which measured the impact
of migration and factory work and others which were specific to questions about women’s status.
For each regression, I used the two proxy HDI variables that were not serving as the dependent
variable as independent variables since they are inarguably measures of human development.
25

Years of women’s education is more specifically an indicator of women’s development and
increased social status. I used the average wage of staff and workers in manufacturing (yuan) to
reflect the impact of wage level on human development, especially because the vast majority of
rural migrant women are employed in manufacturing. I used foreign direct investment net inflow
of as a percentage of GDP because of the tendency of light manufacturing work to be related to
foreign companies and investments. To proxy the growth of migration, for which numbers are
inconsistent at best, I took a weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth for four Chinese
cities with significant migrant populations: Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. This
number serves as the approximation for migrant volume between 1990 and 2010. The final
independent variable is total fertility. A lower level of fertility is generally associated with higher
levels of education and resources for children, resulting in improved human development.
Though China is notorious for its one-child policy, the vast number of loop holes and special
conditions in this policy allow fertility to be a valid measure in this study (Cai, 2010).
Results:
In the first regression (Table 1), the dependent variable years in school for women aged
15 to 44 is regressed against the average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing, GNI per
capita at PPP, life expectancy, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a
percentage of GDP, and the weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four
proxy cities. The statistics that proved to be significant (at a significance value of p=0.05) were
average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with a p-value of 0.0184, total fertility with
a p-value of 0.0011, GNI per capita at PPP with a p-value of 0.0118, and life expectancy with a
p-value of <0.0001. Foreign direct investment and weighted average GDP were not found to be
significant. Average wages and life expectancy had positive coefficients of 0.000092257879 and
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0.34558754 respectively, while total fertility and GNI per capita at PPP had negative coefficients
of -0.32602968 and - 0.00038717695. This regression had an adjusted r-squared value of 0.9984.
In the second regression (Table 2), I regressed life expectancy against the average wages
of staff and workers in manufacturing, years in school for women aged 15 to 44, GNI per capita
at PPP, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a percentage of GDP, and the
weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four proxy cities (Shenzhen,
Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai). The statistics that proved to be significant were the average
wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with a p-value of 0.0399, years in school of women
with a p-value of <0.0001, GNP/capita at PPP with a p-value of 0.0184, and total fertility with a
p-value of 0.009. Foreign direct investment and weighted average GDP growth were not found to
be statistically significant. Years in school of women, GNI/capita at PPP, and total fertility had
positive coefficient values of 2.7429559, 0.0010364504, and 0.78873697, respectively while
average wages had a negative coefficient of -0.00023232759. This regression had an adjusted rsquared value of 0.9982
In the third regression (Table 3), I regressed GNI per capita at PPP against the average
wages of staff and workers in manufacturing, years in school for women aged 15 to 44, life
expectancy, total fertility, foreign direct investment net inflow of as a percentage of GDP, and
the weighted average of the percentage of GDP growth from the four proxy cities. The statistics
that proved to be significant were the average wages of staff and workers in manufacturing with
a p-value of >0.0001, years in school for women with a p-value of 0.0118, life expectancy with a
p-value of 0.0184, and foreign direct investment with a p-value of .0418. Total fertility and
weighted average GDP growth were not found to be statistically significant. Average wages, life
expectancy, and foreign direct investment had positive coefficients of 0.2479811, 345.86741,
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and 41.213636. Years in school for women had a negative coefficient of -1025.4898. This
regression had an adjusted r-squared value of 0.999.
Discussion
In Table 1, the regression data indicates that average wage of staff and workers in
manufacturing, total fertility, GNI per capita at PPP, and life expectancy are the independent
variables that have a statistically significant impact on years in school for women ages 15 to 44.
The statistical significance of average wages contradicts the feminist economist view that
increased wages are a shallow measurement of human development and female social
development. Rather, it seems that manufacturing wages have a significant correlation with
increased education for Chinese women. This supports the contemporary feminist view that the
wages earned in factories are a key stepping stone to human, and specifically women’s,
development, which is strongly represented in education as one of the three factors of the HDI
indicator. In addition, life expectancy has an extremely high statistical significance in this
regression. This is to be expected as both variables are considered to be direct measurements of
human development, and should thus should be highly correlated.
Total fertility in this regression has a negative coefficient of -.32602968, which is to be
expected and supports the contemporary view of factory labor. This coefficient indicates that a
decrease in total fertility has a significant impact on increased education. It is generally accepted
that increased education and decreased fertility because of educated women’s ability to pursue
more opportunities in addition to childrearing (Cohen, 2013). Therefore, women’s reduced
fertility as a result of later marriage due to manufacturing work results in an increased number of
years in school for women, improving their social status.
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Surprisingly, GNI per capita has a negative coefficient in this regression. It stands to
reason that as societies become wealthier, they invest more money into education, especially
given that average wages have a positive coefficient in this regression. However, the coefficient
for this variable is exceedingly low at -0.00038717695, thus indicating that is not practically
significant. This negative coefficient can also be attributed to the fact that the original women
who entered factories in the 1990s were not generally further educated as a result of their factory
employment. It is their daughters who would benefit from an increased GNI per capita.
Therefore, the increased education for women is not consistent over the two decades, and is more
heavily concentrated toward the latter half of this time span. The high r-squared value of this
regression indicates that the data was a very close fit to the statistical model in this regression.
In Table 2, the regression shows that the average wage of staff and workers in
manufacturing, years in school for women ages 15 to 44, GNI per capita at PPP, and total
fertility have a statistically significant impact on life expectancy. Years in school has a
statistically and practically significant relationship with life expectancy. Given that both are
typical measurements of human development, this is unsurprising. Additional education leads to
more lucrative opportunities for women, which lead to healthier lifestyles. Furthermore,
Regression 1 indicates that the average wages in manufacturing have a significant positive
relationship with women’s education. Therefore, the increase in education resulting from
manufacturing wages also correlates with a longer lifespan. Both increased education and a
longer lifespan are inarguably positive benefits that seem to stem from manufacturing wages,
supporting the neoclassical and contemporary feminist outlook on manufacturing employment.
GNI per capita is positively correlated with life expectancy, which is indicative that the
rising wealth in the country, largely stemming from exports, is leading to healthier lifestyles.
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This is an expected result as increased disposable income can be used on a number of life
improving products and services including healthier foods, improved medical care, and improved
domestic sanitation. However, total fertility is surprisingly also positively correlated with life
expectancy, indicating that increased fertility leads to a longer life expectancy. It would
generally be assumed that fewer pregnancies would lead to longer lives for women. This
unexpected correlation can potentially be explained by the fact that healthcare measures have
improved internationally and in China over the past two decades, allowing for safer childbirth
and fewer deaths related to childbirth. This would make total fertility a less significant
determinant of life expectancy for women.
Average wages is the only variable that has a negative coefficient, and thus a negative
impact on life expectancy. This was a surprising outcome, and stands contrary to reason given
that greater wages traditionally result in increased health standards and thus a longer life
expectancy. This unexpected data can be explained in two fashions. The first explanation is that
while the variable has a statistically significant p-value, its coefficient is extremely low at
0.00023232759. This indicates that the variable is in fact not practically significant in its
relationship to life expectancy.
The second explanation for the low average wages coefficient relates to the minimum
wage in China. Though minimum wages were first introduced in China in 1993, they were
generally not applied to migrant labor and penalties for ignoring minimum wage laws in
manufacturing were minimal. It was not until 2004 that minimum wage reforms were passed,
resulting both in a rise in minimum wage and more significant enforcement of minimum wage
(Mayneris and Poncet, 2014). Migrant workers, and thus female factory workers, were
disproportionately affected by the lax minimum wage laws between 1993 and 2004. The impact
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of their lower buying power due to lower wages and higher purchase prices could very likely be
the cause of the negative coefficient of average wages in this regression. Furthermore, data after
2004 should likely show a positive correlation between average wages and life expectancy.
Overall, this regression has data that is extremely fit to the statistical model as indicated by its
high r-squared value.
In Table 3, the data indicates that average wage of staff and workers in manufacturing,
years in school for women ages 15 to 44, life expectancy with projections, and net flows of
foreign direct investments as a percentage of GDP have a statistically significant impact on GNI
per capita at PPP. Average wages has an extremely significant relationship with a p-value of less
than 0.0001. This close relationship makes sense as the majority of those involved in
manufacturing are China’s rural poor. Given that manufacturing wages are significantly higher
than those available in rural areas, mass access among the poor to these heightened wages would
have a significant positive impact on the country’s GNI, and thus also it’s GNI per capita.
Years in school for women has an extremely high coefficient with a value of 1025.4898.
Past research has shown that educating women leads to growth both in a nation’s GDP and that
employing more women leads to an increase in per capita income (Matsui, 2013). Given that the
wages in manufacturing are allowing more girls and women to be educated, this should lead to
more women in financially lucrative and socially powerful roles in the future. Therefore, the GNI
per capita should continue to rise significantly with the projected increased education for
females. Life expectancy also has a particularly high coefficient in this regression with a value of
41.213636. This can likely be explained by the fact that a longer life expectancy leads to more
productive years for the typical Chinese person, and thus a greater long-term economic
contribution.
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The last statistically significant variable in this regression is foreign direct investment.
This is not surprising as FDI and GNI have an intimate and connected relationship. Foreign
direct investment has spurred and funded many of the manufacturing and exporting opportunities
in China. This investment not only leads to huge revenues through the export of products, but
also through the creation of millions of direct and indirect jobs, and thus, wages. The economic
activity created through foreign direct investment directly impacts the increase in GDP and
national wages, and thus GNI and GNI per capita.
Conclusion
The question of whether rural Chinese women’s participation in light export
manufacturing helps or hinders, empowers or exploits, is much debated. The vast majority of
literature regarding this subject is qualitative, and clearly divided between the neoclassical and
feminist economist camps. Through my quantitative statistical analysis, I proved my hypothesis
that migration and factory work have a positive impact on the lives and social development of
rural Chinese women, supporting the neoclassical and contemporary feminist views regarding
manufacturing participation.
The most influential discovery in my research is that the average wages of staff and
workers in manufacturing is statistically significant and has a positive correlation in all three of
the regressions. This indicates that the wages provided by manufacturing labor play a significant
role in increasing life expectancy, GNI per capita, and women’s education. This relationship
alone disproves the crux of traditional feminist argument against manufacturing work. The
significance of the average wages variable in all three regressions shows that the wages provided
by manufacturing are not the sole benefit of manufacturing, nor are they a hollow measurement
of development and improvement. Wages provided by manufacturing are instead, as indicated by
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the neoclassical economists and contemporary feminists, a necessary vehicle for improving
women’s status and human development in China.
It must be acknowledged that traditional feminists are correct in their belief that
manufacturing work and the resulting increased wages are not an overnight solution for all of
China’s gender-based issues. However this research indicates that in the past twenty years, the
work and wages provided by manufacturing have allowed women to seek more education, which
will allow them to gain more influential positions in society and in their professional lives. The
benefits of manufacturing have also allowed the Chinese people to increase their personal
incomes, and thus have more disposable income to spend on both luxuries and improved
personal care and extend their lives. Based on the correlation of manufacturing work and wages
with the variables composing the Human Development Index, it is clear that neoclassical
economists and contemporary feminists are correct in their belief that light export manufacturing
is a source of empowerment and opportunity for China, especially for rural Chinese women.
Limitations
The first limitation I faced in this study was difficulty finding data. While the National
Bureau of Statistics of China has census reports dating back to 1996, the categories of
information and methods of measurement provided from year to year are inconsistent. I also
encountered language barriers in finding information, particularly when trying to find data for
rural provinces. Another limitation was the extremely high r-squared values of the regressions,
indicating an unusually high correlation among the variables. This indicates that unaccounted
causal factors likely impacted the variance of the regressions.
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Future Work
As stated above, the vast amount of literature regarding the subject of rural Chinese
women’s participation in light export manufacturing is qualitative in nature. For this reason, it is
crucial that future work include a more in-depth quantitative analysis of the issues surrounding
this phenomenon. An important question to be asked regarding this subject is the impact on the
children of female migrant workers. The migrants of the 1990s are now old enough to have
children who are old enough to have gone to college or be employed. Researching the degree of
benefit that these children have experienced from their mothers’ participation in manufacturing
would be a strong indication of the long term effects of migrant manufacturing work.
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Tables
Table 1:
Multiple linear regression results:
Dependent Variable: Years in School Women 15-44
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Total Fertility
(number of children), GNI/capita PPP, Life Expectancy with projections, Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth
Parameter estimates:
Parameter

Estimate

Intercept

Std. Err.

-16.938746

Average Wage of Staff and
Workers in Manufacturing
(yuan)
Total Fertility (number of
children)

Alternative DF

T-Stat

P-value

1.6281431

≠ 0 13

-10.403721 <0.0001

0.000092257879 0.000034250784

≠ 0 13

2.6935991

0.0184

-0.32602968

0.078630691

≠ 0 13

-4.1463413

0.0011

-0.00038717695

0.00013233035

≠ 0 13

-2.9258363

0.0118

0.34558754

0.022463941

≠ 0 13

15.384101 <0.0001

Foreign direct investment,
net inflows (% of GDP)

0.010963857

0.012878586

≠ 0 13

0.8513246

0.41

Weighted Average % GDP
Growth

-0.0022798099

0.0021849983

≠ 0 13

-1.043392

0.3158

GNI/capita PPP
Life Expectancy with
projections

Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:
Source DF
Model

6

SS
15.720956

MS

F-stat

P-value

2.6201594 1998.5253 <0.0001

Error

13 0.017043603 0.0013110464

Total

19

15.738

Summary of fit:
Root MSE: 0.036208374
R-squared: 0.9989
R-squared (adjusted): 0.9984
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Table 2
Multiple linear regression results:
Dependent Variable: Life Expectancy with projections
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Years in School
Women 15-44, GNI/capita PPP, Total Fertility (number of children), Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth
Parameter estimates:
Parameter

Estimate

Intercept

Std. Err.

Alterna DF
tive

T-Stat

P-value

50.226951

1.469938

≠ 0 13

-0.00023232759

0.0001017633

≠ 0 13

2.7429559

0.17829809

≠ 0 13

15.384101 <0.0001

0.0010364504

0.00038455172

≠ 0 13

2.6952172

0.0184

0.78873697

0.25713228

≠ 0 13

3.0674367

0.009

Foreign direct investment, net
inflows (% of GDP)

-0.034759069

0.03601224

≠ 0 13 -0.96520155

0.3521

Weighted Average % GDP
Growth

0.0067830818

0.0061259632

≠ 0 13

0.2882

Average Wage of Staff and
Workers in Manufacturing
(yuan)
Years in School Women 15-44
GNI/capita PPP
Total Fertility (number of
children)

34.169434 <0.0001
-2.2830196

1.1072678

0.0399

Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:
Source DF
Model

6

SS
112.79022

MS

F-stat

P-value

18.798371 1806.5143 <0.0001

Error

13 0.13527644 0.01040588

Total

19

112.9255

Summary of fit:
Root MSE: 0.10200921
R-squared: 0.9988
R-squared (adjusted): 0.9982
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Table 3
Multiple linear regression results:
Dependent Variable: GNI/capita PPP
Independent Variable(s): Average Wage of Staff and Workers in Manufacturing (yuan), Years in School
Women 15-44, Total Fertility (number of children), Life Expectancy with projections, Foreign direct
investment, net inflows (% of GDP), Weighted Average % GDP Growth
Parameter estimates:
Parameter

Estimate

Std. Err.

Alternative DF

6570.29

≠ 0 13

0.2479811 0.010533

≠ 0 13

Years in School Women 15-44

-1025.4898 350.4946
1

≠ 0 13

-2.9258363

0.0118

Total Fertility (number of children)

-153.84375 190.2946
4

≠ 0 13

0.80845023

0.4334

Life Expectancy with projections

345.86741 128.3263
6

≠ 0 13

2.6952172

0.0184

Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(% of GDP)

41.213636 18.25182
8

≠ 0 13

2.2580553

0.0418

-4.6676473 3.468167
5

≠ 0 13

-1.3458541

0.2014

Intercept

-17030.278

Average Wage of Staff and Workers in
Manufacturing (yuan)

Weighted Average % GDP Growth

T-Stat
-2.5920131

P-value
0.0223

23.543254 <0.0001

Analysis of variance table for multiple regression model:
Source DF
Model

SS

MS

F-stat

P-value

6 62933438 10488906 3020.5796 <0.0001

Error

13 45142.258 3472.4814

Total

19 62978580

Summary of fit:
Root MSE: 58.927764
R-squared: 0.9993
R-squared (adjusted): 0.999
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